Politización y burocratización. El doble reto de la calidad institucional en España

Resumen

Este artículo analiza la calidad institucional en España a partir de dos desequilibrios interrelacionados: los excesos de burocratización y de politización que padecen las Administraciones públicas. En primer lugar, se señalan los notables efectos que tiene la calidad de gobierno —definida no por la cantidad de servicios públicos prestados, sino por la implementación imparcial, eficaz y no corrupta de los mismos— sobre el bienestar de una comunidad. A continuación, el artículo examina la tensión entre legalidad y gestión, subrayando el peso histórico de la tradición legalista española, que dificulta la puesta en marcha de iniciativas de modernización en la gestión pública. Los controles procedimentales ex ante se imponen a los controles de resultados ex post. Por su parte, la gestión de recursos humanos es, a la vez, demasiado rígida en niveles intermedios y demasiado volátil y politizada en los niveles superiores. Esta combinación no genera los incentivos adecuados ni para la innovación ni para la prevención de abusos.

Palabras clave:

Administración pública, meritocracia, regulación

Citas

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