Las crisis de refinanciación en los mercados de deuda soberana

Resumen

Presentamos un modelo dinámico sencillo en que el gobierno de una economía abierta pequeña puede experimentar una crisis financiera y acabar en una suspensión de pagos de la deuda soberana. Que ocurra o no una crisis puede depender de las expectativas de los inversores internacionales, así como de factores fundamentales como cambios en el ingreso nacional y cambios en el tipo de interés internacional. En nuestro modelo, si los inversores esperan una crisis, no compran las emisiones de deuda nueva y el gobierno no puede refinanciar la deuda que vence. Nos referimos a las crisis que dependen de factores fundamentales como crisis de solvencia y a las crisis que dependen de expectativas de los inversores que se auto-cumplen como crisis de refinanciación. Como en otros modelos de crisis de deuda, el gobierno puede eliminar la posibilidad de una crisis reduciendo el volumen total de deuda. A diferencia de los modelos en que las crisis solo dependen en fundamentales, el gobierno puede eliminar la posibilidad de una crisis de deuda incrementando la madurez de la deuda, reduciendo así la necesidad de refinanciación.

Palabras clave:

deuda soberana, vencimiento de la deuda, crisis de liquidez, crisis de refinanciación, pánico financiero

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