El sector bancario chino como catalizador de la recuperación económica tras la COVID-19

Carlos J. Tórtola Sebastián
Neus Alfaraz Hernández
Resumen

En menos de un año, China ha logrado contener la pandemia de la COVID-19 y retomar progresivamente la actividad económica a través de un ambicioso plan de estímulo fiscal, monetario y sectorial. Para ejecutar estas medidas de estímulo, las autoridades han recurrido al sistema bancario chino como principal mecanismo de transmisión, incrementando los riesgos del propio sistema bancario, que podrían verse agravados en 2021. Las autoridades chinas, conscientes de este peligro, están gestionando selectivamente estos riesgos para intentar consolidar la recuperación económica iniciada en 2020.

Article Details

Palabras clave:
banca en la sombra, China, sistema financiero, crisis económica, coronavirus, política económica
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